Тамаддун нури Volume 6 (2026) · pp. 70-74
LENIENCY AND WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN CARTEL DETECTION: INCENTIVE-BASED REFORM PROPOSALS FOR UZBEKISTAN
Kosimova, Gulnoza, Косимова, Гулноза, Kosimova, Gulnoza
Abstract
This article analyzes leniency and whistleblower mechanisms as incentive-based instruments for detecting cartel agreements, with a special focus on public procurement and Uzbekistan’s current legal framework. The study argues that cartel enforcement is ineffective where cartel participants and insiders have no realistic incentive to disclose secret collusion and where individual informants are not protected against retaliation. The article examines the European Commission leniency model, the United Kingdom’s financial reward system for cartel informants, Australia’s anonymous reporting portal, EU whistleblower protection standards, Uzbekistan’s Article 20 leniency rule under the Law “On Competition”, and Resolution No. 829 of the Cabinet of Ministers on rewards for reporting corruption-related offences.
cartel agreements; leniency; whistleblower; financial rewards; anonymous reporting; public procurement.картельные соглашения; leniency; whistleblower; финансовое вознаграждение; анонимное сообщение; государственные закупки.kartel kelishuvlari; leniency dasturi; xabarchi; moliyaviy rag‘bat; anonim xabar berish; davlat xaridlari.
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